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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO  THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Setondary legislaCion for the setond stage of Etonomic and Monetary Union . Secondary legislatioa for dte secoad stage of FA'onomic  and Monetary llnion 
(Communication to the Council  and the European Parliament) 
The.European Council  held on  21  and  22_  Junf?~ 1993  ~tCopenhagen invited the  Commission  to 
present  proposals  on  all  the  necessary  implementing  me~ures .relating to-the  second.  stage  of 
Economic and Monetary  Union  (EMU),  so  that they  can  be  adopted  by  the Council  as  soon  as 
possible after entry  into force  of the Treaty  and before  I  January  I 994.  In  this perspective,  the 
Commission transmits herewith four draft proposals for legislative acts. 
The  legal  basis  for  these  draft  proposals  is  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community 
(EC Treaty)  as amended  by  the Treaty  on  European  Union.  As  long  as  the  Treaty  has  not yet 
entered  into  force,  legislation  cannot  start  formally.  The  formal  preparation  of legislation  risks 
running into severe time constraints because the time between the entering into force of the Treaty 
and the start of  the second stage of EMU will be short. In order to comply with the aforementioned 
mandate of the European Council, it is necessary to  prepare legislation in the field of EMU on an 
informal basis. While the Commission has the intention, after the entry into force of the Treaty, to 
make  formal  proposals  in  line  with  these  draft  proposals,  it  reserves  the  right  to  introduce 
modifications in the light of the circumstances. 
The  purpose  of the  draft  proposals  is  to  start  informally  the  necessary  discussions  with  the 
Community bodies involved, such that the formal procedures can be initiated immediately after the 
entry into force of the EC  Treaty and brought to an  end within the objective set by  the European 
Council. Two of the four texts call for cooperation with the Parliament according to Article 189c 
of the EC Treaty, the other two for consultation. One text requires consultation of the Committee 
of Governors and of the Monetary Committee. 
The following draft proposals are annexed to this Communication: 
- Regulation  aiming at specifying the prohibition of access of the public sector to  central  bank 
credit (Article  104  of the  EC  Treaty).  The  purpose  is  to  specify  definitions,  like  Hoverdraft 
facilities or any other type of credit facility" or "public undertakings". Secondary legislation on 
Artice I 04 is not obligatory, but the clarification of a number of questions through legislation is 
· highly  desirable, as has also been suggested by the Committee of Governors. Cooperation with 
the European Parliament is required; 
- Regulation  aiming  at  specifying  the  prohibition of privileged  access  of the  public  sector  to 
fin-ancial institutions (Article l04a of  the ECTreaty). Secondary legislation, whichis compulsory, 
serves to  specify  definitions as  well.  This concerns  the terms  "privileged access",  "financial 
institutions",  "prudential  considerations"  and,  as  for  Article  104,  "public  undertakings". 
'"  Cooperation with the European Parliament is required; 
2 Regulation  on  the  application  of the  excessive  deficit  procedure  (Article  I  04c( 14)  of the 
EC  Treaty). The purpose of this Regulation  is  to  lay  down detailed rules and definitions for the 
application of the provisions of the Protocol on  the excessive deficit procedure.  Its subject is  to 
provide further details of the definitions to  be used including the definition of public debt, and 
to  lay  down  rules  for  the  reporting of data by  the  Member States  to  the Commission.  The 
European Parliament is to  be consulted; 
- Decision on the establishment of the key  for the contributions of central  banks to the financial 
resources of the European Monetary Institute (Article 16.2 of the EMJ  Statute). The purpose is 
to specify rules to be applied by  the Commission when it  provides the data on  population and 
gross domestic product for the establishment of  the key. The European Parliament, the Committee 
of Governors and the Monetary Committee are to be consulted. 
A further piece of legislation relating to the European Monetary Institute is  under preparation but 
is  not  annexed  to  this  Communication.  This  concerns  the  consultation  of the  Institute  by  the 
authorities of the  Member States on draft legislative provisions  in  its  field of competence.  The 
Commission intends to  present the respective draft proposal  informally  in  due course. 
Later in the year, the Commission will also propose some slight amendments to existing Community 
legislation necessary for completing the preparation of the second stage. 
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specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to 
in  Articles  I  04 and  I 04b( I) of the Treaty 
establishing the  European Community 
4 Explanatqn Memorandum 
At its meeting in  Copenhagen, the European Council invited the Commission to  present proposals 
concerning all measures necessary for the operation of the second stage of Economic and Monetary 
Union, such that these proposals could be adopted by  the Council after the entry into force of the 
Treaty  and before 1 January  1  994.  Following this request and  in  the absence of a legal  basis on 
which to adopt a formal proposal, the Commission presents the annexed draft proposal. Its purpose 
is to start informally the necessary discussions with the Community bodies involved, such that the 
formal  procedures can be initiated immediatly after the entry  into force of the Treaty and brought 
to an end within the objective set by the European Council. While the Commission has the intention, 
after the entry into force of the Treaty, to  make a formal proposal in  line with this draft proposal, 
it reserves the right to  introduce modifications in the light of the circumstances. 
I.  Introduction - general considerations 
Fiscal policies. in  contrast to monetary policy, will  not be centralized in Stage Three of Monetary 
Union;  responsibility  will  remain  with  Parliaments  and  Governments  of  Member  States. 
Notwithstanding  this,  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community  includes  a  number  of 
provisions to promote fiscal discipline.  Articles  I 04 and  I 04b, together with  Article l 04a, form the 
set of provisions  aiming  at  enhancing  the  disciplinary  forces  of the  market  mechanism.  These 
provisions already apply from the beginning of Stage Two of Economic and Monetary Union. 
The prohibition on direct central bank financing of the public sector is also an  important element 
of central bank independence. Central banks' monetary policy operations shall not be influenced by 
public financing needs. 
Finally, the acquisition and holding by  central banks of public sector debt, in so far as  this debt is 
remunerated below market rates, might affect in  Stage Three monetary income for the ESCB as a 
whole, diminishing the monetary income for all central banks of Member States. 
The present draft Council Regulation based on  Articles 104 and 1  04b of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community specifies the  meaning of "overdraft facilities  and any  other form  of credit 
facility"  (Article  l  of this draft).  It makes clear under  which  conditions specific forms of credit 
arising in the performance of fiscal  agent functions are not deemed to constitute credits within the 
meaning of Article 104 (Articles 3 to 6 of this draft). It defines, both for Articles 104 and 104b and 
in parallel to  Article  I 04a, the term "public undertakings", building upon existing legislation, and 
makes clear that central banks do  not form  part of the public sector (Article 7 of this draft). 
Portugal  and  the  United  Kingdom  are authorized to  maintain  for  the  time  being  some  specific 
arrangements which would normally fall  under the prohibition of Article  I 04.  These authorizations 
are laid down in  the Protocol on Portugal and paragraph ll of the Protocol on certain provisions 
relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
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IL  Comments on the Ar1icles 
Ar1ide  I 
Overdraft fatilities or any other kind of credit facility 
Article 1 explains that debt with a fixed maturity, if acquired before I January 1994, is not included 
in the definition of "overdraft facilities and any  other form of credit facilitY"  and therefore rriay  be ·· ·· · 
held until  maturity. Outstanding stocks of overdraft facilities  and any  other kind of credit facility 
have  to  be  redeemed  or  converted  into  fixed~maturity debt  before  1  January  1994.  As  from 
1 January 1994, central bank laws and statutes in Member States must no longer contain provisions 
allowing  for the  possibility  of overdraft facilities  or any  other  form  of credit facility;  it is  not 
sufficient that svch credits in  practice are no longer granted. 
Ar1icle 2 
Direct purchMes 
- '  2.1  While Article 104 prohibits overdraft and other credit facilities as well as the .direct purchase 
of public sector debt instruments, it does not explicitly mention secondaly IIUU'ket purchases. 
The main reason is that in  most countries the large and liquid market in  government paper 
is vital for the conduct of  open market operations. The intention is certainly not to introduce 
a  possibility  to  circumvent  the  ban  on  central  bank  financing  of the  public  sector.  The 
.·  .. 
.  : 2.·2 
· present  draft  proposal  makes  this  clear  by  stating  that  secondary  market  purchases  are 
compatible with Article 104 only if conducted for monetary policy reasons.  The provision 
stating that Member States undertake to abstain from influencing the decision~making bodies 
of the national central banks to this effect is limited to  the aspect of central bank financing 
of the public sector; it does not aim at anticipating central bank independence otherwise  . 
Article 104 does not specify whether the prohibition applies to central banks andovernments 
of the same country only or whether it covers also cross-bonier credits. During Stage Two, 
direct "cross~country"-purchases of public sector marketable debt instruments by the central 
bank of another Community country do  not have the same implications as if the domestic 
central bank steps into the market, since there is no creation of central bank  money in the 
debtor country in  the former case.  Rather, such transactions are of a commercial nature to 
be seen ·in the context of foreign exchange reserve management Furthermore, as long as the  · 
debt instruments involved are marketable, such transactions are unlikely to affect the working 
of the market mechanism on public sector debt. 
* * * 
6 The fact that credits arise as a "by-product" in  the context of various transactions with  the public 
sector does not in principie exempt them from the application of Article I 04.  Articles 3 to 6 specify 
which  transactions are not covered by  the definition of "overdraft facilities or any  other form  of 
credit facility".  These exemptions are  based on  the  principle  that  the  prohibition  of Article  I 04 
should not hinder the efficient operation of fiscal  agent functions by  the central banks of Member 
States (as mentioned in Article 21  of the ESCB Statute). 
Article 3 
Intra-day  credits 
In many countries, central banks hold all the major accounts of the central government, and all the 
central government receipts and payments flow directly, or are channelled indirectly, through these 
accounts. lntra··day credit to the Government arises when payments are executed by the central bank 
on behalf of the Gvv~rnmeht on a real time basis and net debtor positions arise during the day.  In 
a strict sense, such intra··day credit is a form of very short term central bank financing of the public 
sector. 
In the development of modern payments systems there is a trend towards real  time gross settlement 
systems.  Article  l 04 should not hinder an  efficient execution of fiscal  agent functions,  including 
payments transactions, by central banks. Furthermore, due to its very short term and technical nature 
there are no implications for the conduct of an  independent monetary policy in Stage Three of EMU 
to be expected. Finally, the existence of intra-day credit does not diminish the working of the market 
mechanism on government borrowing.  To  avoid circumvention of Article 104, however, intra-day 
credit is explicitly defined so as to exclude an  extension into overnight credit. 
Article 4 
Colledion of cheques 
This Article specifies the permissible procedures for the collection of cheques by  central banks on 
behalf of their  governments.  Such  practices  may  imply  (interest-free)  short-term  central  bank 
financing ("float") if cheques written by  the private sector in  favour of the Treasury are credited by 
the central  bank to the Treasury account immediately  upon, or very  soon after,  receipt while the 
corresponding debits to the accounts of the banks of the issuers of the cheques are made one or a 
few days later. 
In  principle,  a  positive float  from  the  collection  of cheques  is  a  kind  of short-term  credit  and 
therefore inconsistent with Article  104.  The direct effects of a positive float  are relatively minor; 
the short-term liquidity management may, however, be affected. 
Therefore, in  principle cheques should not be credited to  the Treasury account before the drawee 
is  debited;  however,  this  is  difficult to  ensure  in  every  individual  case.  For  cost and  efficiency 
reasons, under certain conditions a more pragmatic approach is acceptable. The solution chosen in 
Article 3 introduces fixed  lags  between the  reception  of the cheque by  the central  bank  and the 
crediting of  the public sector account. These lags should correspond to the practices in each Member 
State and should be such  that the  operations on  average ensure neutrality  with  respect to  credit 
effects. 
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Holdings of coins 
In  most Community  countries,  coins are  issued  by  the  Treasury  and  put  into  circulation  by  the 
central bank. In some cases, the government account is credited by  the central bank before coins are 
put into circulation and is not debited when  reflows to the central bank occur. 
Such transactions in  principle constitute a form of (non-interest bearing) credit However, in  soine 
countries, it would be rather impractical, or even impossible, to apply this principle in  a strict sense 
whereby a central bank would only be allowed to credit the account of the issuer of coins once the 
coins have been put into circulation and, conversely, would be obliged to debit on the government 
account immediately the counter-value of any reflows of coins.  Instead, the national central banks 
should  be  allowed (albeit not  be obliged) to  hold  coins  issued  by  the Treasury  up  to  a  certain 
ceiling.  For practical reasons, a ceiling equivalent to  I  0% of coins in  circulation is suggested. 
Article 6 
Credits in the fulfilment of international monetary obligations 
The IMF being an intergovernmental organization, commitments under IMF for balance-of-payments 
support are to be fulfilled by the member governments with the central bank acting as fiscal agent 
In  most Member States currently  such  lending is ultimately  financed by  the central  bank  which 
includes this lending in  its balance sheet Likewise, the Medium-Term Financial Assistance for EC 
Member States'  balance of payments provides for  credits by  recourse to  Member States;  in  this 
event, it is current practice in a number of Member States that such loans are not financed out of 
the budget but through the central bank. 
From a  strictly  formal  point of view, these transactions  constitute central  bank financing of the 
public sector; from an economic point of view. however, such operations are not in  contradiction 
with  the aims of Article  I  04.  The national  central  banks should  thus be ·allowed (albeit not be 
obliged) to extend loans to the governments for these purposes. 
Article 7 
Definition of the  public sector 
The definition of  the public sector entities given in  Articles I 04 .and I  04b( I) is considered clear and 
comprehensive.  Two specifications appear useful,  however.  Paragraph  I defines the term  "public 
undertakings"  using  the  definition  given  in  Commission  Directive  80/723/EEC;  the  exemptions 
mentioned  in  this  Directive  are,  however,  not appropriate  for  the  purpose of Articles  104  and 
1  04b( I).  Using this definition guarantees consistency with secondary legislation for Article I 04a of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community  . 
. Paragr~ph 2 makes clear that the ECB and national central banks are exempted from the definition 
of the public sector in  order to  make sure,  for example, that central banks may  grant each other 
credits. 
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I 04b( I) of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to  the Treaty establishing the European Community as  amended by  the Treaty on 
European Union, and in particular Articles  I  04,  I 04b(2) thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from  the Commission, 
In cooperation with the European  Parliament, 
Whereas Articles  l 04  and  l 04b( 1)  are  directly  applicable;  whereas  definitions of terms  used  in 
Articles  104 and  104b(l) may  be specified if necessary; 
Whereas  the  prohibition  on  direct  central  bank  financing  of the  public  bodies  referred  to  in 
Article 104 is an essential element in  submitting the public sector in  its financing operations to the 
discipline of the market mechanism, thus helping to avoid excessive deficits; 
Whereas clarification of the term "overdraft facilities  and any  other form  of credit facility"  will 
create legal certainty about the treatment of stocks of credit outstanding as of 31  December 1993; 
Whereas  outright  purchases  on  the  secondary  market  of securities  issued  by  the  public  bodies 
addressed  in  Article  104  are  important  for  the  conduct of monetary  policy;  whereas,  however, 
secondary market purchases, if not conducted for  the sole purpose of monetary  policy, afford an 
opportunity to circumvent Article  I 04 and its objectives; 
Whereas during Stage Two of Economic and Monetary Union, direct purchases by  the central bank 
of one Member State of marketable debt instruments issued by the public sector of another Member 
State  do  not  negatively  affect  the  conduct  of monetary  policy  or  the  working  of the  market 
mechanism on public sector debt;  whereas such transactions are rather of a commercial  nature to 
be seen in the context of foreign exchange reserve management; 
Whereas credit offered by central banks to the public sector may take varied forms;  whereas credits 
resulting from  delays between crediting and debiting for transactions carried out by  the European 
Central  Bank  or the  central  banks of the  Member  States on  behalf of the  public  sector  are  in 
principle a form of credit facility;  whereas, however, Article 21.2 of the Statute of the European 
System of  Central Banks and the European Central Bank explicitly allows for the provision of fisca1 
agent functions by central banks of  Member States; whereas, therefore, certain qualifications to this 
general principle for specific transactions are necessary; 
Whereas credits of central banks to the public sector which arise during the day  may  be useful for 
the smooth operation of payment systems and comply with the objectives of Article I 04 as  long as 
they  are not extended overnight; 
9 Whereas the prohibition on  the direct central  bank financing of budget deficits should not hinder 
the efficient operation of fiscal  agent functions:  whereas,  therefore, the collection of cheques by 
central banks on behalf of  governments should not be forbidden by  Article I 04 as long as this does 
not, on the whole, entail central  bank credit to the government; 
Whereas holdings by  central banks of coins issued by the Treasury  in  principle constitute a form 
of non-interest bearing credit to  the government; whereas, however, in  some countries it  would be 
rather impractical or even impossible to prohibit such credit altogether; 
Whereas credits granted by  central  banks to  their  respective Member States in  the fulfilment of 
commitments  under  IMF  balance-of-payments support  and of medium-term  financial  assistance 
granted on the basis of Council Regulation (EEC) No  1969/88<11  serve the purpose of lending abroad 
for balance of payments support; 
Whereas public undertakings fall under the prohibition of Articles I  04 and 1  04b( l );  whereas public 
undertakings  are  defined  in  Commission  Directive  80/723/EEC(2>,  as  amended  by 
Directive 85/413/EEC<
3
);  whereas  that  Directive  mentions exemptions to  the definition  of public 
undertakings which are not appropriate in  the context of Articles  I  04 and  I  04b( 1  ); 
Whereas a clarification of these issues is  advisable; 
Whereas  the  definitions  in  this  Regulation  might  be  revised,  where  necessary,  in  the  light  of 
experience, and with  a· view to the establishment of the European System of Central Banks and to 
the conduct of a common monetary policy in  Stage Three, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article  I 
(Overdraft facilities or any other kind of credit facility) 
· For the purpose of Article 104, "overdraft facilities or any other kind of credit facility"  shall mean 
the granting or holding of  such facilities by the European Central Bank ("ECB") or the central banks 
of the  Member States ("national central  banks")  in  favour of Community  institutions or bodies, 
central governments, regional, local or.other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, 
· or public undertakings of  Member States (hereinafter referred to as ''public sector"). The holding of 
claims with  a  fixed  maturity,  acquired before  1 January  1994·,  shall  not be considered a  credit 
facility. 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
OJ No L 178, 8.7.1988, p.  1. 
OJ No L  195, 29.7.1980, p.  35. 
OJ  No L 229, 28.8.1985, p.  20. 
lO Article 2 
(Direct purchases) 
I.  For the purpose of Article I 04, direct purchases shall include purchases by the ECB or by  the 
national central banks of debt instruments issued by the public sector on the secondary market 
unless such transactions are conducted solely for the purpose of implementing monetary policy 
and  unless  the  Member States  undertake  to  abstain  from  influencing the  decision-making 
bodies of the national central banks in  that regard. 
2.  During Stage Two of Economic and Monetary Union, purchases by  the national central bank 
of one Member State of marketable debt instruments issued by  the public sector of another 
Member State shall  not be considered direct purchases within  the  meaning of Article  104, 
provided that such purchases are conducted for the sole purpose of managing foreign exchange 
reserves. 
Article 3 
(Intra-day credits) 
Credits by  the ECB or the national  central banks to the public sector within the  day  shall  not be 
considered a credit facility within the meaning of Article I 04, provided that they  are not extended 
overnight. 
Article 4 
(Collection of cheques) 
Where the ECB or the national central banks receive from the public sector, for collection, cheques 
issued by third parties and credit the public sector's account before the issuer has been debited, this 
shall not be considered a credit facility, provided that a fixed time-lag has expired since the receipt 
and  provided that the time-lag corresponds to  the  average  pattern  of cheque  collection  in  each 
Member State such that any float which might arise would be exceptional and of a small amount 
and would average out over a short period. 
Article 5 
(Holdings of coins) 
The holdings by  the ECB or the national  central  banks of coins issued by  the public sector up  to 
an amount of 10% of  coins in circulation shall not be considered a credit facility within the meaning 
of Article  l 04. 
Article 6 
(Credits in  the fulfilment of international monetary obligations) 
Credits granted by the ECB or the national  central banks to the public sector in  the fulfilment of 
commitments  under  IMF  balance-of-payments  support and of medium-term  financial  assistance 
granted on the basis of Regulation (EEC) No  1969/88 shall not be considered a credit facility within 
the meaning of Article  l 04. 
ll Article 7 
(Public sector) 
I.  For the purpose of  Articles I  04 and l 04b( I), "public undertakings" shall mean any undertaking 
over which the public authorities may  exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by 
virtue oftheir ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern 
it. 
2.  For the purpose of Articles 1  04  and  1  04b( I), the ECB and the national central banks do not 
form part of the public sector.  · 
·Article~ 
This Regulation shall enter into force on  l  January  1994. 
·-This Regulation shall be binding in  its entirety and directly applicable in all  Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
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specifying definitions for the application of the prohibition of privileged access 
referred· to in Article 1  04a of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community 
13 '.  :~ 
Explanatory Memorandum 
At its meeting in  Copenhagen, the European Council invited the Commission to  present proposals 
concerning all measures necessary for the operation of the second stage of Economic and Monetrry 
Union, such that these proposals could be adopted by  the Council after the entry into force of the 
Treaty. and before 1 January  1994.  Following this request and in  the absence of a  l~gal basis on 
which to adopt a formal proposal, the Commission presents the annexed draft proposal. Its purpose 
is to start informally the necessary discussions with the Community bodies involved, such that the 
formal procedures can be initiated immediately after the entry into force of the Treaty and brought 
to an end within the objective set by the European Council. While the Commission has the intention, 
after the·entry into force of the Treaty, to make a formal proposal in  line withthis draft proposal, 
it reserves the right to introduce modifications in the light of the circumstances. 
I.  lntrochKtion - general  ~nsidendions 
The prohibition of privileged access (Article I 04a), together with the prohibition of direct central 
bank  financing  (Article  104)  and  the  no  bail  out  clause  (Article  104b),  serve  the  purp<)se  of 
submitting the public authorities to market discipline in  their financing operations. The respect of 
the  price  mechanism  should provide  an  incentive  for  the authorities  to  pursue  strict budgetary 
· ·  · policies and so  helps to avoid excessive deficits. 
The prohibition of  privileged access enters into force on I  January  1994, when the second phase of 
the process towards Economic and Monetary Union starts.  Four definitions should be provided for • 
the application of the probition of.privileged access in secondary legislation: 
privileged access 
prudential considerations 
public undertakings 
financial institutions. 
··  In the comments on the Articles more details are given on the content of the definitions. 
. D.  Conunena on the  Anides 
Article 1 
Definition of privileged access 
·.  -:·.·. 
·.:  · The notion of privileged access is concerned with liabihties from the public ·sector (for example,· 
· securities issued by the public sector and loans granted to the public sector) implying that deposits 
..  :  .. 
of the public sector cannot form  the subject of privileged access. 
·Not only the measures which directly oblige financial  institutions to hold public debt but· also the 
measures which have that effect are prohibited. The wording is similar to .the one in  Article 85 ·of 
the EC  Treaty on competition law. 
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~  ~  '· The reference to the compatibtlity with market conditions. based on  the wording of Articles 3a and 
l02a of the  EU  Treaty, does  not exclude that the  public sector can  benefit from  the good  credit 
standards it normally has.  The wording also  allows that obligations which  are in  accordance with 
the free  market principle  (for example,  the  obligation  for  primary  dealers to  quote  public debt) 
cannot  be  considered  privileged  access.  In  the  same  spirit,  the  obligation  imposed  on  certain 
financial  institutions  to  finance  at  special  conditions  social  housing  is  compatible  with  the 
prohibition of privileged access. 
With respect to interest subsidies or other transfers from  one part of the public sector to  another. 
which de facto lower the borrowing cost, this is not considered privileged access to the extent that 
the financial institution receives the market price. 
Only  privBeged  access  to  financial  institutions  is  banned  leaving  privileged  access  to  financial 
markets outside the scope of the prohibition. This means, for example, that tax advantages available 
to everybody which favour the holding of public sector liabilities are not covered by the prohibition. 
By contrast tax advantages for public sector liabilities targeted at financial institutions are forbidden. 
In order to  facilitate the reading,  the entities listed in  Article  l 04a which  may  not benefit from 
privileged access are referred to as  'public sector'. 
Artide :Z 
Definicion of prudential considerations 
Prudential  measures can lead to privileged access to  the extent that they encourage the holding of 
public debt  which,  in  normal  circumstances,  represent  a  low risk.  Indeed,  public  debt  paper  is 
usually relatively  _!iguid and the government is, in principle, a good debtor because of its prerogative 
~es:go  that it is justified to make sure that financial institutions observe certain prudential 
measures leading to the holding of public debt paper. On the other hand, prudential supervision may 
not become a way to circumvent the prohibition of privileged access. 
The definition of  prudential considerations is based on attention for the financial system as a whole, 
financial institutions and customers. Therefore, national laws, regulations or administrative actions 
directed  at financial  institutions,  for  example  in  the  absence of EC  legislation  in  the  field,  are 
recognized as valid references for prudential considerations, as  long as they  respect EC  Jaw. 
The formulation implies that EC legislation with a privileged treatment of public debt liabilities, for 
example  in  the  weighting  scheme  applied  in  the  calculation  of the  solvency  ratios  or  in  the 
diversification  requirements  on  UCITS,  are  compatible  ith  the  prohibition  of privileged  access 
because they are based on prudential considerations. The same applies for some measures in the life 
and non-life insurance sector which are only abolished on  1 July 1994 by recently adopted Council 
Directives, while the prohibition of privileged access enters into force on  l  January  1994. 
15 Atticle 3 
Definition of public undertakings 
The meaning of the entities listed in Article l 04a, which may not benefit from privileged access (the 
public  sector),  is  considered  clear  and  comprehensive  except  for  public  undertakings  whose 
definition is given in paragraph  I. It is the definition of Commission Directive 80/723/EEc<'> on the 
. transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings. It is preferred 
to have the full wording of the definition rather than a reference to a Commission Directive which 
can be changed without the Council being involved. 
Paragrah 2 makes clear that the central banks of the Member States and the European Central Bank 
cannot be included in the public sector so that they can oblige financial institutions to hold central 
bank liabilities for monetary policy purposes (for example, minimum reserve requirements). · 
However, the monetary policy instruments must notbe designed in such a way that the only manner 
to obtain  central  bank credit is  through  the  vehicle of public  sector  liabilities,  for example,  as 
collateral  or  in  open  market  operations.  Nevertheless,  there  is  no  objection  to  limit  specific 
operations to particular public sector liabilities satisfying certain characterisitcs. 
Article 4 
Definition of fi1181Kial  institutions 
In paragraph 1, financial institutions are defined by  making reference to existing EC legislation. In 
addition, there is a catch-all clause. If  EC legislation for certain financial  institutions is not ready 
they are covered by the catch-all clause. 
In paragraph 2, the central banks of  the Member States and the European Central Bank ar~ excluded 
on the argumentation that their relations with the public sector are dealt with in  Artide 104.  Even 
if postal financial services are obliged to make available to the public sector the funds they have. 
at their disposal they are excluded from the definition because they are not··a financial  institution 
· sufficiently separate from the government. 
(I)  OJ No L 195, 29.7.1980, p.  35. 
16 Proposal for a 
COUNCIL  REGULATION (EEC) 
specifying definitions for the application of the prohibition of privileged access 
referred to  in Article  1  04a of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty  establishing the European Community as  amended by  the Treaty  on 
European Union, and in  particular Article 104a(2) thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from  the Commission, 
In cooperation with the European Parliament, 
Whereas the prohibition of privileged access forms an  essential  element of the submission of the 
public sector in its financing operations to the discipline of the market mechanism and so makes a 
contribution to the avoidance of excessive deficits; 
Whereas prudential  considerations are  considered a justification for  making an  exception  to  the 
prohibition of privileged access; whereas in so doing, however, any exceptions should in  particular 
be compatible with Community law on the liberalization of capital  movements; 
Whereas public undertakings fall under the prohibition of Article 1  04a; whereas public undertakings 
are  defined  in  Commission  Directive  80/723fEEC(I>,  as  amended  by  Directive  85/413fEEC(
2>; 
whereas that Directive mentions exemptions to  the definition of public undertakings which are not 
appropriate in the context of the prohibition under Article J  04a; 
(I) 
(2) 
OJ No  L  195, 29.7.1980, p.  35. 
OJ No L 229, 28.8.1985, p.  20. 
17 Whereas privileged access is formulated in terms of access to financial institutions and not financial 
markets;  whereas  different  definitions  of  financial  institutions  are  given  in  Council 
Directive  89/646/EECC~>. as  amended  by  Directive  <)2/JO!EEC<
4>,  and  in  Directive 91/308/EEC<
5>; 
whereas neither of  the Directives provides a suitable definition of  financial institutions in the context 
of the prohibition of privileged access; 
Whereas the central  banks of the Member States and  the  European  Central  Bank have a special 
relation  to  financial  institutions,  and  in  particular  to  credit  institutions  which  for  reasons  of 
monetary policy can be obliged to hold liabilities from the central bank of the Member States and/or 
the European  Central  Bank;  whereas the  central  banks of the Member States  and the European 
·Central Bank must nevertheless take account of the prohibition of privileged access in the design 
and use of monetary policy instruments which mostly  involve liabilities of the public sector and 
therefore may not take measures which establish privileged access by the public sector to financial 
institutions; whereas the central banks of the Member States and the European Central Bank have 
a special relationship with the public sector, with which Article 104 of the Treaty deals; 
Whereas the definitions in this Regulation might be revised in the light of experience, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article  t 
For the purpose of Article 1  04a, 'any measure establishing privileged access' shall be defined as any 
law, regulation or other measure which is not in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition, and which obliges financial institutions to acquire or hold liabilities 
of  Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, 
other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States (hereinafter referred 
to as 'public sector'), or which has such acquisition or holding as its object or effect. 
Article 2 
For the purpose of Article  I  04a, 'prudential considerations' shall  be those which  refer to national 
laws,  regulations  or  administrative  actions  based  on,  or consistent  with,  Community  law  and 
designed to promote the soundness of  individual financial institutions so as to strengthen the stability 
of the financial system as a whole and the protection of  the customers of  those-financial institutions. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
OJ No  L 386,30.12.1989, p.  1. 
OJ No L It 0,  28.4.1992, p.  52. 
OJ No  L  166, 28.6.1991, p.  77. 
18 1.  For the purpose of Article I 04a, 'public undertakings' shall be defined as any undertaking over 
which the public authorities may exercise directly or indrectly a dominant influence by  virtue 
of their ownership of it, their financial  participation therein, or the rules which govern it. 
2.  For the purpose of Article  I 04a,  the  European  Central  Bank and  the central  banks of the 
Member States do not form  part of the public sector. 
The exemption shall  be  without prejudice to  compliance  with  Article  l04a by  the  central 
banks of the Member States and the European Central Bank. 
Article 4 
1.  For the purpose of Article  1  04a, 'financial institutions' are: 
credit  institutions  as  defined  in  the  first  indent  of  Article  I  of  Council 
Directive 77!780/EEC<
6>; 
insurance undertakings as  defined in  Article  1 of Council  Directive 92/49/EEC(7>; 
assurance undertakings as defined in  Article 1  (a) of Council  Directive 92/96/EEC<
8>; 
UCITS as  defined in  Article 1  (2) of Council  Directive 85/611 !EEC<
9>; 
investment firms as  defined in  Article 1  (2) of Council Directive 93/22/EEC00>; 
institutions for retirement provision as  defined in  Council Directive ../../EEC
11l; 
other undertakings or institutions the principal activity of which is  to acquire holdings 
of financial assets or to transform financial claims. 
2.  The following institutions do not form part of the financial  institutions whose definition was 
given in paragraph  1  : 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(ll) 
the central banks of the Member States and the European Central Bank; 
the postal financial services, if forming part of the government. 
OJ No L 322, 17.12.1977, p.  30. 
OJ No L  228,  11.8.1992, p.  l. 
OJ No L 360, 9.12.1992, p.  1. 
OJ No L 375, 31.12.1985, p.  3. 
OJ No L  141,  11.6. 1993, p.  27. 
OJ No L 
19 Article S 
This Regulation shall enter into for:ce  on  I January  1994. 
This Regulation shall be binding in  its entirety and directly applicable in  all  Member States. 
Done at  Brussels, 
20 
For the Council 
The President Proposal  for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) 
Annex 3 
on the application of the provisions of the Protocol on  the excessive deficit procedure annexed to 
the Treaty establishing the European Community 
21 Explanatory Memorandum 
At its meeting in Copenhagen, the European Council invited the Commission to present proposals 
concerning  all  the  measures  necessary  for  the  operation  of the  second  stage of economic  r.nd 
monetary union, such that these proposals could be adopted by the Council after the entry into fcrce 
of the Treaty and before 1 January 1994. Following this request and in the absence of a legal basis 
on which to adopt a formal  proposal,  the Commission presents the annexed draft  proposal.  Its 
purpose is to start informally the necessary discussions with the Community bodies involved, such 
that the formal procedures can be initiated immediately after the entry into force of the Treaty and 
·brought to an end within the objective set by the European Council.  While the Commission has the 
intention, after the entry into force of the Treaty, to make a formal proposal in  line with this draft 
proposal, it reserves the right to introduce modifications in the light of the circumstances. 
I.  General considerations 
From the beginning of the second stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Article J  09e(  4) 
requires the Member States to endeavour to avoid excessive government deficits, without there being 
yet the legal obligation to avoid excessive deficits which applies to Member States participating in 
the third stage or to Member States with a derogation. The importance of  this 'best endeavour' clause 
derives from the fact that the achievement of a government budgetary position without a deficit that 
is excessive as determined in accordance with Article 104c(6) is one of the criteria with reference 
to the fulfilment of which the Commission and the European Monetary Institute will examine the 
achievemenf of a high degree of sustainable convergence in their reports prior to the start of the 
third stage. 
Even though there is thus no legal obligation to avoid excessive deficits· in  the second stage, it is 
clear that the excessive deficit procedure as described  in  Article  1  04c  and  the  Protocol  on the 
excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty (hereinafter called "the Protocol") should not make 
a  distinction  between  the  second  stage  or  the  third  stage  in  determining  whether  a  deficit  is 
excessive.  This holds in particular for the tasks assigned to the Commission in paragraphs 2 and 
3 of Article 104c of the Treaty. 
According to Article I 04c(2), the Commission should "  ... monitor the development of the budgetary 
situation and of  the stock of  government debt in the Member States with a view to identifying gross 
errors.  In  particular,  it shall  examine compliance ... ".  From this  assignment  it  is  clear that the 
monitoring  of the  Commission  should  not  be  restricted  to  the  two  criteria  mentioned  in 
Article l 04c(2), but should pertain to the development of the budgetary situation in general. This 
interpretation  is  confirmed  by  two  facts.  Firstly,  the  Commission  may  make  a  report  if, 
notwithstanding the fulfilment of the requirements under the two criteria. it is of the opinion that 
there is a risk of  an excessive deficit in a Member State and thus acts on the basis of  data other than 
those for the two criteria. Secondly, in its report, the Commission should take account of "whether 
the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and take into account all other 
relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of  the Member State". 
Consequently, it follows that in  order to execute the tasks assigned to  it, the Commission has to 
monitor  a wide range of information, not only in the budgetary field but also in the economic field. 
22 ln the Protocol, the Treaty lays down the reference values for the two criteria on government deficit 
and debt (Article I), a number of definitions of variables used for the excessive deficit procedure 
(Article 2), a number of obJigations for the  Member States (Article 3) and the obligation for the 
Commission to provide the statistical data to  be used (Article 4).  Article  104c(l4) of the Treaty, 
which is the legal basis for this Regulation, requires the Council, acting by  a qualified majority on 
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, to lay down detailed 
rules and definitions for the application of the provisions of the Protocol. Consequently, the subject 
of  this Regulation is to provide further details of the definitions to be used for the application of the 
Protocol and to  lay  down  rules for the reporting by  the Member States. 
Several definitions in the Protocol are given with reference to the European System of Integrated 
Economic  Accounts  (ESA).  The  Regulation  provides  a  more  precise  definition  by  giving  the 
classification codes used in  ESA, second edition°) For public debt, where no reference to ESA  is 
given in the Prot.ocol, a more detailed definition, partly in terms of classification codes from ESA, 
is provided. Although ESA was established in close collaboration with the Member States, the final 
responsibility has alway5 been taken by the Statistical Office of the European Communities (SOEC). 
This division of respom:ibliity wiJI  remain valid  for new editions of ESA as well as  for questions 
regarding its interpretation.  The Commission will  have to change the classification  codes in  the 
Regulation if these change in  new editions of ESA. 
The Member States are required to report their data "promptly and regularly"  to the Commission. 
This poses the problem of the transition between public accounts used for national purposes and the 
harmonised definitions required for the excessive deficit procedure. Since Member States have to 
report their data (in accordance with the Treaty definitions) promptly to the Commission and since 
they have to ensure, in  accordance with the Protocol, that national procedures in the budgetary area 
enable them to meet their obligations in this area, the presumption is that Member States will report 
their  data in  accordance  with  the Treaty  definitions  at  the  same time  as  new data  in  national 
definitions becomes available.  However, in order to take account of  the delay which may be needed 
for the transposition between national and Protocol definitions, it is proposed to establish a system 
of twice-yearly reporting which would provide the minimum requirements to be met by the Member 
States, in terms of the timing of their reporting. 
Given the fact that the Commission has to monitor more than the data strictly required for the deficit 
and  debt  criteria of Article  1  04c(2),  the  Regulation  contains  a  limited  set  of other  data,  the 
transmission of which to the Commission is considered to be in the interest of the Member States. 
The  alternative,  that  these  data  would  be  collected  by  the  Commission,  would  imply  that  the 
Commission would take politically sensitive decisions on the basis of data for which Member States 
have not taken the responsibility. Consequently, this limited set of data has been included among 
the definitions and among the data to be provided to the Commission. 
(I)  Statistical Office of the European Communities, European System of Integrated Accounts  -
ESA, second edition, November 1978. 
23 II.  Commen1s on the  Anides 
Anide I 
This Article  defines the terms 'government', 'government deficit',  'government primary  balan~e·, 
'government investment' and 'government debt'.  For the first four terms, the definitions are given 
with reference to their classification codes in  ESA, second edition. 
The definition of government debt is  more precise than  in  the Protocol.  First of all, references to 
ESA  have  been  introduced  explicitly  for  clarity.  Secondly,  the  issue  of nominal  valuation  of 
liabilities has been  addressed,  notably  for the case  in  which the  face  value of a  liability  differs 
considerably  from  ·the  present  value.  Finally,  a  rule  is  given  for  the  valuation  of liabilities 
denominated in foreign currencies. 
Anitle 2 
This Article gives the definition for Gross Domestic Product at market prices (GDPmp  ).  Reference 
has been made to the definition given in the Council Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom of 13 February 
1989  on  the harmonization of the compilation of gross national  product at market prices (GNP 
Directive)<
2
),  where  GDP  is  defined  with  reference  to  ESA  in  an  intermediate step towards the 
definition  of GNP.  For  the  years  for  which  they  are  available,  GDPmp  data  established  in 
accordance with the GNP Directive will  be used. 
Artide 3 
This  Article  provides a  definition  for  the  terms  'actual'  and  'planned'  used  in  the  Protocol.  A 
difference  is  introduced  between  the  definition of these terms,  in  this  article,  and  the  reporting 
requirements for particular years, in Chapter 2 of  the Regulation. For instance, if a government were 
to  decide on  a  deficit for  two  years ahead,  this deficit would  be defined as  a  'planned'  deficit, 
whereas the planned deficit asked for in the reporting requirements is that of the current year. 
Paragraph 1 of this Article refers to Article 3 of the Protocol, which gives the governments of the 
Member States the responsibility  for the deficits of general government.  It therefore  assigns the 
responsibility for the reporting of  general government data to the governments of  the Member States. 
This paragraph mentions "current and subsequent years"  to take  account of the point in  time at 
which the  data are reported.  For instance,  a budget for the coming year adopted in  October and 
reported in December would refer to a 'subsequent' year, whereas it would refer to a 'current' year 
if reported in January.  The requirement that the figures be consistent with the most recent decisions 
of  the budgetary authorities means. inter alia, that governments should take account of amendments 
voted by parliaments to their proposed budgets or of any other decisions affecting the budget which 
have been taken after they have made their budget proposal. 
(2)  OJ No  L  49, 21.2.1989, p.  26. 
24 Paragraph  2  defines  the  term  'actual',  recognizing  that  historical  stat1st1cs  may  undergo  seve::-al 
revisions before they  become final.  It is rendered clear, in particular, that even  first estimates for 
a past year are considered to  be actual data, such  that there is no gap between actual  and planned 
data. 
Artide 4 
This  Article describes the reporting procedure which  the  Member States have  to  respect  and the 
content of what has to be reported. 
Paragraph 1 lays down the general principle that Member States shouJd report their data promptly 
to the Commission.  In order to take account of possible delays due to transposition of data from 
national definitions to Protocol  definitions, the  Member States are given extra time in the form of 
deadlines twice a year which they could use  if needed.  It is however assumed that between these 
dates,  Member  States  would  transmit  aH  relevant  supplementary  information  for  current  and 
subsequent years.  This would  allow the  Commission  to  have  the  most  up-to-date  picture of the 
situation in the Member States, even if only on  the basis of data in  national  definitions.  The two 
dates before which certain data have to  be provided according to the Protocol  definitions  by  the 
Member States have been fixed,  after consulting the Member States, as  I  February and  1 July of 
any particular year.  The Commission is aware that this requires adaptations of national procedures 
in some cases. The proposed deadlines are however needed in view of the timing of the subsequent 
steps of the excessive deficit procedure. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 lay  down the reporting requirements in  terms of particular years to be reported 
before the deadlines of I  February and 1 July.  The Member States should report in  particular the 
elements  explaining  the  transition  between  national  government  accounts  and  the  Protocol 
definitions,  as  well  as  the  correspondence  between  changes  in  levels  of public  debt  and  the 
government deficit.  It  is to  be noted that, although not strictly required according to the Protocol, 
the Member States are asked to  report their planned debt.  This  is  considered to  be  of particular 
importance in assessing whether the debt-to-GOP ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace and therefore in  the  interest of the Member States. 
Paragraph 4 allows those Member States where the budget year is different from the calendar year 
to report their planned data for budget years, on the condition that actual data for the last two years 
are also presented for budget years. 
Articles 5 and 6 
These Articles define the limited set of data of which the Commission considers that it  is  in  the 
interest of the Member States that they  report them simultaneously  with  their actual  and planned 
deficit  and  debt  data.  It concerns  data  which  the  Commission  would  take  into  account  for  its 
monitoring of  the budgetary situation and as relevant factor for its report in accordance with Article 
104c(3).  In  particular,  Article  5  refers  to  data  on  government  investment  and  the  government 
primary balance. Defaults on loans with a government guarantee or the take-over by the government 
of debt of other sectors is of particular relevance for the Commission's assessment on the risk of an 
excessive deficit.  Consequently, Article 6 requires that the Member States provide the Commission 
with  data on current and foreseeable payments in  fulfilment of government guarantees as  well  as 
current and foreseeable debt take-overs. 
25 Article 7 
This  Article  given  the  reporting  requirements  for  Gross  Domestic  Product  at  market  prices 
· (GDPmp).  The reporting procedure is somewhat different from  that for the deficit and  debt data 
· because, after a certain cut-off date, the actual data for GDPmp established under the procedure for 
. the GNP Directive are available and should be used. 
Article 8 
This Article empowers the Commission to change the classification codes of ESA referred to in the 
Regulation should the codes be changed in future editions ofESA.  This would only be a technical 
adjustment of the Regulation. 
·~· 
26 ANNEX TQ WE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
Some definitions of classification codes in  FSA 
This  Annex  provides  some  definitions  of classification  codes  from  the  European  System  of 
Integrated  Economic  Account,  second  edition  (ESA)<JJ  to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  draft 
proposal for the Regulation. The definitions are only given for illustrative purposes.  ESA  provides 
the complete definitions, which are more detailed than can be reproduced here. 
Institutional sectors 
860 - General government 
The sector general government includes all  institutional units which are principally engaged in  the 
production of non-market services intended for collective consumption and/or in  the redistribution 
of national  income  and  wealth.  The principal  resources  of these  units  are  derived  directly  or 
indirectly from  compulsory payments made by  units belonging to other sectors. 
S61 - Sub-sector: Centro/ government 
The sub-sector central  government includes all  administrative departments of the State and other 
central  agencies  whose  competence  extends  over  the  whole  economic  territory,  except  for  the 
administration of the social security funds. 
S62 - Sub-sector: Local government 
The sub-sector local government includes those types of public administration whose competence 
extends to only part of the economic territory, apart from local agencies of  the social security funds. 
S63  - Sub-sector: Social security funds 
The sub-sector security funds include all central and local institutional units whose principal activity 
is  to  provide  social  benefits  and  whose  main  resources  are  derived  from  compulsory  social 
contributions paid by other units. 
(3)  Statistical  Office of the European Communities, European  System  for Integrated Economic 
Accounts - ESA, second edition, November 1978. 
27 Transactions in goods and services 
P41  - Gross fixed capital formation 
Gross  fixed  capital  formation  represents  the  value  of durable  goods  intended  for  non-military 
. purposes, which  are acquired by  resident producer units in order to  be  used for a period of more 
than one year in their process of production, including the value of any services embodied in fixed 
capital goods. 
Redistributive transactions 
R41  - Actual interest 
Actual  interest is the form  of remuneration  in  respect of certain  financial  assets (deposits,  bills, 
bonds and credits) characterised by the payment at predetermined dates of a fixed.percentage of the 
nominal value of the asset. 
Aggregates 
N 1 - Gross domestic product at market prices 
Gross domestic product at  market  prices represents the final  result of the  production  activity  of 
resident producer units.  It corresponds to  the economy's total  output of goods and services less· . 
intermediate consumption, plus VAT on products and  net taxes on imports excluding VAT. 
.  . 
Gross domestic product at market prices is equal to the sum of gross value added at market prices. 
of all  the different branches. plus VAT on products and net taxes on imports excluding VAT. 
It is  also  equal  to  the sum  of gross value added  at  market prices of all  the different sectors plus 
VAT on products and net taxes on imports excluding VAT and less the intermediate consumption 
of banking services which is not a11ocated  by  sector. 
N5  - Net lending (borrowing) 
Net lending (borrowing) is defined for the sector general government (S60) as the balancing item 
of gross saving and capital transfers  received minus gross fixed  capital formation,  the change in 
stocks,  net purchases of land and intangible assets and capital transfers paid. 
28 Financial transactions 
F20 - Currency and transferable sight deposits 
The heading currency and transferable sight deposits includes the notes and coin and sight deposits 
which  are  immediately  convertible  into  the  legal  tender  of the  country  without  any  kind  of 
restriction, and which are transferable by  cheque, banker's order or the like. 
F30 - Other deposits 
The heading other deposits covers all deposits other than transferable sight deposits; that is, deposits 
which cannot be utilised at any  moment, without restriction or without first  being converted into 
notes and coin or transferable sight deposits.  These assets are instruments of financing. 
F40 - Bills and short term bonds 
The heading bills and short term  bonds groups together assets with a short maturity, usually  up  to 
12  months, but with a maximum of 2 years, represented by  securities intended to  circulate. whose 
nominal  value,  determined on  issue,  is expressed  as  some round figure,  and which  bear interest, 
generally paid in  advance.  They are repayable at their nominal value at a date, or starting from  a 
date,  fixed at the time of issue.  These securities are instruments of investment. 
F50 - Long term bonds 
The heading long term bonds groups together securities which at the time of issue have a maturity 
of several  years,  which  bear fixed or index-linked rates of interest (the interest  frequently  being 
payable by coupons) and which are redeemable starting from a date fixed at the time of issue. Long 
term bonds are negotiable instruments of investment generally quoted on the stock exchange. 
F79 - Other short term loans 
The  sub-heading  other short term  loans  covers  all  short-term  loans  other  than  those  which  are 
classified as short term trade credit or as accounts receivable and payable. 
F89 - Other medium and long term loans 
The subheading other medium and  long term loans covers all  medium and long term loans other 
than  those classified as  medium and long-term trade credit. 
29 Proposal  for  a 
COUNCIL  ~EGULA  TION {EEC) 
on  the application of the provisions of the  Protocol on  the .excessive deficit 
procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community as  amended by  the Treaty  on 
European Union, and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 104c, paragraph  14, thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European  Parliament (lJ, 
Whereas the definitions of government, deficit and investment are laid down in the Protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure by  reference to the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts. 
(ESA)<
2
>  ;  whereas  ESA  provides  commonly  accepted  definitions  which  may  undergo  revision; 
whereas precise definitions referring to the classification codes of ESA are required; 
Whereas the definition of debt laid down in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure needs 
to be amplified by reference to the classification codes of ESA; whereas certain aspects concerning 
the valuation of  debt need further clarification; whereas the definition and recording of interest laid 
down in ESA have to be adjusted to take account of new financial  instruments; 
Whereas Council Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom of 13  February 1989 on the harmonization of the 
compilation of gross national product at  market prices<
3
> provides an  adequate, detailed definition 
of gross domestic product at market prices; 
Whereas the Commission is required to provide the statistical data to be used in the excessive deficit 
procedure; 
Whereas detailed rules are required to  organize the prompt and regular reporting by  the Member 
States to the Commission of their planned and actual  deficits and of the levels of their debt; 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Statistical  Office of the  European  Communities,  European  System of Integrated  Accounts 
ESA, second edition, November 1978. 
OJ No L 49, 21.2.1989, p.  26. 
30 Whereas  pursuant  to  Article  l 04c,  paragraphs 2  and  3,  the  Commission  shall  monitor  the 
development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States 
and shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of government deficit and debt 
criteria; whereas the Commission shall, where a Member State does not fulfil the requirements under 
one or both criteria, take into account all  relevant factors;  whereas the Commission has to assess 
whether there is a risk of an  excessive deficit in  a Member State: whereas the Commission should 
therefore be provided by the Member States with information complementary to the reported deficit 
and debt figures; 
Whereas the definitions and rules in this Regulation may be revised in  the light of experience, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
CHAPTER 1:  DEFINITIONS 
Article  I 
For the purposes of  the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure and of this Regulation, the terms 
given below are defined according to the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA) 
as follows.  (The codes in  brackets refer to  ESA  second edition). 
I.  Government is the sector general government (S60) subdivided into  the sub-sectors central 
government (S6 1  ),  local government (S62), and social security funds (S63 ). 
2.  Government deficit (surplus) is the net borrowing  (net  lending)  (NS)  of the  sector  general 
government (S60).  The  interest  comprised  in  the government  deficit  is  the  sum  of actual 
interest (R4 1) and capitalized interest.  Interest relating to several accounting periods shall be 
distributed among the different periods. 
3.  Government primary balance is the government deficit or surplus as defined in  the preceding 
paragraph excluding actual interest (R4 1) paid by  government, and capitalized interest. 
4.  Government  investment  is  the  gross  fixed  capital  formation  (P41)  of the  sector  general 
government (S60). 
5.  Government debt is the total nominal value of all  liabilities outstanding at 31  December of the 
sector  general  government  (S60),  with  the  exception  of those  liabilites  of  which  the 
corresponding financial assets are held by  the sector general government (S60). 
31 Government debt is  subdivided into the headings:  Currency and Deposits;  Securities; Loans; 
and  all  Debt  not  elsewhere  classified.  The  heading  Currency  and  Deposits  includes  the 
headings  Currency  and  transferable  Sight  Deposits  (F20)  and  Other  Deposits  (F30).  The 
heading Securities  includes the  headings  Bills and  Short-term  Bonds  (F40)  and  Long-term 
Bonds (FSO).  The heading Loans includes Other Short-term Loans (F79) and Other Medium 
and Long-term Loans (F89). 
The nominal  value of a  liability  outstanding at  31  December is  the  face  value.  Where  the 
present value of a liability  at  the date of issue differs considerably from  the face  value, the 
nominal  value  is  the  present  value.  The  present  value  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of an 
appropriate interest rate fixed for the day the liability is incurred. 
The nominal value of an  index-linked liability corresponds to its face value adjusted by the 
index-related capital uplift accrued to  31  December. 
Liabilities denominated in  foreign  currencies shall  be converted into the national currency at 
the representative market exchange rate prevailing on the last working day of each year. 
Article 2 
Gross domestic product is gross domestic product at market prices (GDPmp) as defined in Article 2 
of Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom. 
Article 3 
1.  Planned deficit and debt-level figures shall  mean  the figures established for the current and 
.  .  ·.  ,  su~~nt  :year~ .by  Member  States  consisten!  ':"ith  the  most  recent_  decisions  of their 
=-~getary  authonhes and reported to  the CommiSSion  under the responsibility provisions of 
~  ·  the first sentence of Article 3 of  the Protocol on  the excessive deficit procedure. 
2.  Actual deficit and debt-level figures shall  mean estimated, semi-final, or final  outcomes for 
a past year. 
1. 
CHAPTER 2 :  REPORTING 
Article 4 
As from the beginning of J  994, Member States shall report to the Commission their pl  d 
and actual  go~emment deficits and levels of government debt promptly but at least :c:e  a 
year, the first time before FebruaryA of  the current year ("yearn") and the second f  b  ti 
July 1 of  year n.  /- rme  e ore 
32 Between their reporting twice a year, Member States shall provide the Commission with any 
relevant supplementary information for the current and subsequent years. 
2.  Before February  I of year n,  Member States: 
shall report to the Commission their planned government deficit for the year n, their up-
to-date estimate of actual government deficit for the year n-1  and their actual government 
deficits for the years n-2. n-3  Wld  n-4; 
shall  simultaneously  provide the  Commission  for  the years n,  n-1  and  n-2  with their 
corresponding public-account budget deficits according to  the public account definition 
which  is  given  most prominence  nationally,  and  with  the  figures  which  explain  the 
transition between this public-account budget deficit and their government deficit.  The 
figures explaining this transition which are provided to  the Commission shall include in 
particular the figures for net borrowing of the sub-sectors (S61 ).  (S62) and (S63); 
shall  report to the Commission their planned level  of government debt for  the year n, 
their up-to-date estimate of the actual level of government debt for the year n-1  and their 
actual levels of government debt for the years n-2, n-3  and n-4; 
shall  simultaneously  provide  the  Commission  for  the  years  n,  n-1  and  n-2  with  the 
figures which explain the contributions of  their government deficit and the other relevant 
factors contributing to the variation of the level of their government debt. 
3.  Before July  l of yearn, Member States: 
shall report to the Commission their updated planned government deficit for the year n 
and their actual government deficits for the years n-1, n-2 and n-3,  and shall fulfil  the 
requirements of the second indent of paragraph 2; 
shall report to  the Commission their updated planned level of government debt for  the 
year n and their actual levels of  government debt for the years n-1, n-2 and n-3, and shall 
fulfil  the requirements of the fourth indent of paragraph 2. 
4.  The  planned  government  deficit  and  government  debt-level  figures  reported  to  the 
Commission  along  the  provisions  of paragraphs  2  and  3  shall  be  expressed  in  national 
currency and in  budget years. 
The actual government deficit and government debt-level figures reported to the Commission 
in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be expressed in national currency and in calendar 
years. 
Where the budget year differs from the calendar year, the Member States shall also report to 
the Commission their actual government deficit and government debt-level figures in  budget 
years for the two budget years preceding the current budget year. 
33 Article 5 
Member States shall, under the same conditions as to timing and year coverage as those laid down 
in  Article  4( 1  ),  (2)  and  (3),  provide  the  Commission  with  the  figures  for  their  government 
investment and their government primary balances. 
Article 6 
Member States shall. under the same conditions as  to  timing as those laid  down  in  Article 4(1), 
provide  the  Commission  with  figures  for  the  current  and  subsequent  years  of the  amount  of 
government  expenditure  and  of government  debt  due  to  the  payments  made  or foreseeable  in 
fulfilment  of government guarantees,  and of the  amount  of debt of entities outside  the  general 
government sector which is taken over or foreseeably to be taken over. 
Article 7 
Member States shall provide the Commission with a forecast for the year n and an estimated figure 
for the year n-1  of their GOP mp under the same conditions as to timing as those in Article 4( I). 
Those  GDP  mp  figures  shall  be  updated  for  the  preceding  years  by  those  forwarded  to  the 
Commission in  accordance with the provisions of Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom. 
Article 8 
Where appropriate, the Commission shall adjust the classification _codes of ESA in Articles I and 4 
·in accordance with any revisions of ESA. 
Article 9 
This Regulation shall enter into force on  1 January  1994:· 
· This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, 
·Done at Brussels, 
34  -
For the Council 
The President Proposal  for a 
COUNCIL DECISION 
Annex 4 
on the establishment of the key  for the financial  resources of the 
European  Monetary  Institute 
35 EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 
At its meeting in Copenhagen, the European Council invited the Commission to  present proposals 
concerning all measures necessary for the operation of the second stage of economic and monetary 
union, such that these proposals could be adopted by  the Council after the  entry into force of the 
Treaty and before  I  January  1994.  Following this request and in the absence of a legal  basis on 
which to adopt a formal proposal, the Commission presents the annexed draft proposal. Its purpose 
is to start informally the necessary discussions with the Community bodies involved, such that the 
formal procedures can be initiated immediatly after the entry into force of the Treaty and brought 
to an end within the objective set by the European Council. While the Commission has the intention, 
after the entry into force of the Treaty, to make a formal proposal in line with this draft proposal, 
it reserves the right to introduce modifications in the light of the circumstances. 
L  General considerations 
· The political will to make the financial structure of the European Monetary Institute (EMl) similar 
to that of the European Central Bank (ECB) is reflected in  the rules which determine the share of 
each central bank in the financial  resources, which are the same as those of the ECB. 
The key for the ECB  capital is of great importance. Apart from the contributions to the capital, it 
determines the share of each central bank in the pooling of external reserves, the weights in voting 
in the ECB Council on financial matters and in  particular, the distribution of the monetary income 
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as a whole. This explains why the rules on how 
to provide the data for the establishment of the key of the ECB have to be specified by the Council. 
Although for the EMI, the significance of the key  is  limited to  the contributions to  the financial 
resources, the distribution of any surpluses (or losses) and the distribution of any proceeds of the 
liquidation of  the EMI to the national central banks; the legislation to be prepared now for the EMI 
will be helpful for the legislation on the key of the ECB which will be adopted immediately after 
the.decision on the start of Stage Three. 
According to Article 29.1 of  the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, each national central bank shall 
be assigned a weighting in the key equal to the sum of 50% of the share of its respective Member 
State in the population of  the Community in the penultimate year preceding the establishment of  the 
ESCB and of 50% of the share of its respective Member State in  the gross domestic product at 
market prices of the Community as recorded in  the last five years preceding the penultimate year 
before the establishment of the ESCB.  Concerning the key  for the financial  resources of the EMI, 
the relevant years will be the same but by  reference to the establishment of the EMI. 
The subject of this Council  Decision are the  rules  which  the  Commission  shall  respect when it 
provides the statistical data for the establishment of  the key as defined above. The rules include the 
definition  and  sources  for  the  statistical  data  on  GOP  and  population  to  be  used,  and  the 
determination of the method of calculation. 
36 The EMJ will be established on  1 January 1994; its Council will  decide on the size of the resources 
and will apply the key for determining the individual contributions at  the beginning of 1994.  The 
data to be used for the establishment of the key therefore must be provided before that date. 
The establishment of the key for the EMI is a once-and-for-all operation. The key will be applicable 
for the whole life-time of the EMI.  The five-yearly  review which is envisaged for the key of the 
ECB  is  irrelevant for the EMI  because  Stage  Three  will  start  at  the  latest  five  years  after  the 
establishment of the EMI. 
IL  CommenD on the Articles 
Article  I 
Article 1 defines what is covered by this decision: the statistical data and the calculation method to 
be used for the establishment of the key.  ln a narrow interpretation, these rules would just specify 
the concept and sources of population  and GDP to  be  used.  However,  methodological  questions 
inevitably  arise between the supply of the data for the individual  countries and the establishment 
of the key, which must also be covered by this decision for the sake of consistency and accuracy. 
Articles...l.. 3. 4.  5.  6 
These Articles specify the definitions and sources for the population and GDP data. The appropiate 
definitions are those of the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts {ESA). 
Since the data on the aggregates in national accounts refer to a period of  one year, the population 
figures to which they are related must represent the mean of the total population over the course 
of the year. 
GDP mp data for the years 1988 to 1991  are the data resulting from the application of the  Council 
Directive on the harmonization of the compilation of GNP mp.  The Directive does not cover 1987; 
thus for 1987 GDP mp data are  those collected by  the Commission (EUROST  AT) from Member 
States according to the established procedure.  1987 data are made consistent with  1988-1991  data 
resulting from the application of the GNP mp Directive. This Directive is applied once a year and 
the resulting data are  formally  accepted by  all  Member States.  The Commission (EUROST  AT) 
adjusts, where necessary. the data for the  previous years not covered by the Directive to ensure the 
consistency of the series. 
At present, the data resulting from the application of the GNP Directive for Germany include the 
new L!nder from October 1990. Since the period for which the key is applied covers the European 
Community including the new German LAnder,  it seems reasonable to  include the GDP mp of the 
new LAnder in the period 1987-1991. Data for total Germany prior to  1991  are not available. For 
the purpose of the present decision, GDP of total Germany for  1987-1990 has been estimated by 
assuming that the share of GOP of the old Lander in  total Germany was the same in  this period 
as in  1991. 
37 In the case of  Portugal, at present  the data resulting from the application of the GNP mp Directive, 
GDP mp include continental GDP for the years  1988 to  1990 and total  GOP for  1991.  However, 
total  GDP for  1988-1990  is  expected  to  be  included  in  the  next  application of the  GNP  mp 
Directive in  Autumn 1993, in  which case GOP covering the whole territory will be used. 
Articles 7.  8,  9 
GDP  data  are  established  in  national  currencies.  The  common  denominator  will  be  the  ecu 
exchange  rate.  The  alternative  of using  Purchasirig  Power  Standards  has  not  been  retained. 
Compared to PPS, exchange rates are unambiguously defined,  thus making the calculation easier 
and  more  transparent~ besides  they  correspond  better  to  the  notion  of market  prices  which  is 
attached to  GOP.  Furthermore, the current Community practice concerning financial  flows from 
Member States to the Community is to use exchange rates as common denominator. 
Article  10 
The EMI will be established on  1 January  1994.  The Council of the EMI  would then decide  at 
. the beginning of 1994 on the size of the resources and apply the key  to determine the individual 
contributions of Member States' Central Banks. The Commission shall thus communicate the key 
before the date of the establishment of the EMI  to the Committee of Governors. 
The rounding up to the nearest multiple of 0.05 percentage points of the weighting, which is referred 
to  in  Article 29  of the  Statute of the  ESCB  and  the  ECB,  is  outside the  scope of the  present 
decision.  It wil1  be up  to the Council of the EMI to establish the rounded key. 
38 · Proposal for a 
CQJJ t'! (]L  J~_fOS_I  Q_N 
on the establishment of the key for the financial  resources of the European Monetary  Institute 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to  the Treaty establishing the European  Community as  amended by  the  Treaty  on 
European  Union,  and in  particular Article  16.2 of the  Protocol  on  the  Statute of the  European 
Monetary Institute annexed to this Treaty, and Article 29.1  and 29.2 of the Protocol on the Statute 
of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank annexed to this Treaty, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European  Parliament<
1l, 
Having regard. to the opinion of the Committee of Governors of the central banks of the Member 
States(2), 
Having regard to the opinion of the Monetary Committeenl, 
Whereas the European Monetary Institute, hereafter referred to  as "EMI", shall  be established on 
1 January  1994~ 
Whereas the EMI shall be endowed with its OMI resources in order to ensure that it will be able to 
perform its tasks and functions with effect from its establishment; 
Whereas the resources of the EMI shaJI  be established by  the Council of the EMI; 
Whereas the resources of the EMI will be provided out of contributions by  national central banks 
in  accordance with the key referred to  in  Article 29.1  of the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank (ESCB and ECB); 
Whereas  the  key  for  the financial  resources  of the EMI  will  be  determined  before  the start of 
Stage Two, 
Whereas the statistical  data to  be used  for  the determination  of the  key  will  be  provided by  the 
Commission in accordance with the rules adopted by  the Council, 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
39 .. Whereas the definition  and sources for  the data to  be  used and the method of calculation for the 
. establishment of the key  should be given; 
Whereas Council Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom of 13  February J  989 on the harmonization of  the 
compilation of gross national  product at  market prices<
4>,  provides for  gross domestic product at 
market prices ("GDP mp")  data approved by  Member States, 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: 
Article  I 
The statistical data  and the method of calculation to  be used for the establishment of the key  for · 
the  contributions by  the  national  central  banks  to  the  financial  resources  of the  EMI  shall  be 
provided by  the Commission according to  the rules specified in the following Articles.  . 
Article 2 
Population and Gross Domestic Product at market prices, hereafter referred to as  "GOP mp", shall 
be defined according to  the European  System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA) in  force. 
GOP mp shall mean GDP mp as defined in  Article 2 _?f Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom. 
Article 3 
· The data on population shall be taken for the year 1992. The mean of the total population over the 
course of the year shall  be used, according to  the ESA  definition. 
Article 4 
· The data on GOP mp shall be taken for each of the years  1987 to  1991. The data on GDP mp of 
a Member State shall be expressed in the relevant national currency at current prices. 
Article 5 
The-data on population shall be those collected by  the Commission (EUROSTA  T) from Member 
States. 
(4)  OJ No L 49, 21.2.1989, p.  26. 
40 1. 
2. 
The  data  for  the  years  1988  to  1991  shall  be  those  resulting  from  the  application  of 
Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom. The data on GOP mp for  1987 shall be the data collected by 
the  Commission  (EUROST  AT)  from  Member States  and  made consistent  with  the  1988  to 
1991  data on GOP mp. 
For Germany, data on  GDP mp for  the years  1987-1990 shall  be estimated as  follows:  the 
GOP mp of the  old  Lander shall  be  multiplied  by  the  ratio  of GOP  mp  of the  whole  of 
Germany to GDP mp of the old Lander in  1991. 
Article 7 
1.  The share of a Member State in the population  of the Community shall be its share in the sum 
of the population of the Member States, expressed in  per cent. 
2.  The GOP mp data of each year and each Member State expressed in  national currencies shall 
be transformed into  data at the ecu  exchange rate.  The exchange rate  used  for  this  purpose 
shall be the average of the exchange rates of all  working days in  a year.  The daily exchange 
rate shall  be the rate calculated by  the  Commission  and  published in  the  'C'  edition of the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. 
3.  The share of a Member State in  GOP mp of the Community shall  be  its share in  the sum of 
GOP mp of the Member States over the five years, expressed in  per cent. 
Article 8 
The weighting of a national central bank in  the key  shall  be the arithmetic mean of the shares of 
the corresponding Member State in  the population and in  GOP mp of the Community. 
Article 9 
The successive steps of calculation shall use sufficient decimal places to ensure their accuracy. The 
weighting of national central banks in  the key  shall be calculated to four decimal places. 
Article  I 0 
The key  shall be communicated by  the Commission to the Committee of Governors of the central 
banks of the Member States before 1 January  1994. 
Done at Brussels, 
41 
For the Council 
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